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Should the Military Less-Than-Unanimous
Verdict of Guilt Be Retained?
By MURL A. LARKiN*
THE Army, Navy and Air Force systems of administering criminal
justice were unified and substantially improved by the enactment of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1951.1 Since that date, con-
tinuing efforts have been exerted to make the pervasive code a truly
enlightened system, carefully balanced between the requirements of
discipline and duty in the military society and the dictates of fairness
and justice as implemented in the federal courts.2 The latest accom-
plishment was the enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968,1 de-
signed to correct the most significant of the deficiencies not previously
removed by legislation or by judicial construction since adoption of
the 1951 Code.4
As early as 1956, Mr. Justice Clark commented that:
In addition to the fundamentals of due process, [the Uniform Code
of Military Justice] includes protections which this Court has not
* Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law; Capt., U.S. Navy, Ret.;
Ass't Judge Advocate Gen. of the Navy, Wash. D.C., 1967-1968; Coauthor, MILIrARY
EVIDENCE.
1. 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of May 5, 1950, ch.
169, 64 Stat. 108).
2. The Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Ju-
diciary of the U.S. Senate has conducted extensive hearings on various proposed
amendments to the Code and has had proposed legislation under study constantly since
at least 1961. E.g., Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and a Special Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1966); Hearings on
Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). For
further discussion see Arnow, The Uniform Code of Military Justice: It Should Be
Improved Now, 48 A.B.A.J. 647 (1962); Brosman, The Uniform Code of Military
Justice: Some Problems and Opportunities, 25 OKLA. BAR ASS'N J. 1605 (1954); Mott,
An Appraisal of Proposed Changes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 35 ST.
JoaN's L. REv. 300 (1961); Powers, Jr., Important UCMJ Changes, 88 U.S. NAVAL
INST. PROCEEDINGS 139 (1962); White, Has the Uniform Code of Military Justice
Improved the Courts-Martial System, 28 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 19 (1953).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335, amending 10 U.S.C. H9 801-936 (1964)
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-936 (Supp. V, 1970)).
4. For a discussion of the principal provisions of the Act, see Ervin, The Mili-
tary Justice Act of 1968, 45 MiL. L. Rav. 77 (1969).
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required a State to provide and some procedures which would com-
pare favorably with the most advanced criminal codes. 5
Subsequent improvements have truly made the system an approxima-
tion to the "most advanced criminal code." In fact, the system has re-
cently been described as comparable to the corresponding substantive
and procedural provisions in the civilian community.6
Significant differences still remain. One of the more important dif-
ferences is that, except in trials of crimes which carry a mandatory death
penalty, unanimous agreement 7 is not required for the court-martial
"jury" to return a finding of guilty.' Curiously, virtually no critical
analysis of this aspect of military law has been made, even though it is, as
Mr. Justice Douglas might say, clearly "less favorable to defendants"'"
than the civilian unanimous verdict requirement." A new look at
5. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1956) (majority opinion).
6. United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 560, 40 C.M.R. 257, 272 (1969)(Quinn, C.J.). See also Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages
Over a Civilian Defendant, 22 MAINE L. REV. 105 (1970); Quinn, Some Comparisons
Between Courts-Martial and Civil Practice, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1240 (1968). For a
different view, see Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REV.
3, 59-103 (1970).
7. Only in Oregon and Louisiana can a less-than-unanimous jury convict the
defendant of an offense with a maximum penalty greater than one year. Montana,
Oklahoma, and Texas allow misdemeanor convictions based upon nonunanimous jury
verdicts. MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; TEX. CONST. art.
5, § 13. Idaho has a constitutional provision permitting legislative enactment of non-
unanimous jury verdicts for misdemeanors. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7.
8. The highest military court, the general court-martial, is composed of a mili-
tary judge, who has no fact-finding powers whatever respecting the question of guilt or
innocence, and five or more members (usually seven, nine or eleven, and occasionally
more) who function in all important respects as a jury. They must determine the
facts, apply the facts to the law as provided them by the military judge, and return a
verdict either of guilty, guilty of a lesser included offense, or not guilty. 10 U.S.C.
§§ 825-29 (Supp. V, 1970).
The intermediate military court, the special court-martial, functions identically:
(1) except that the number of members need only be three or more and (2) except
that the convening authority may decline to appoint a military judge. In the latter case
the punishment jurisdiction of the court may be materially lessened. Of course, if
none is appointed, the members of the court nevertheless function as fact-finders, but
they are instructed on the law of the case from the senior member or President. Id.
9. Article 52 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 852, pro-
vides, in part: "(a)(2). No person may be convicted of any other offense [than of-
fenses for which the death penalty is made mandatory by law], except as provided in
section 845 (b) . . . [which permits findings to be entered in guilty plea cases without a
vote] or by the concurrence of two thirds of the members present at the time the vote
is taken."
10. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
11. Mr. Justice Douglas has adverted to it as one of the indicia that courts-martial
are inferior tribunals. Id. at 263. See also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (Black, J.).
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the basis, legality and necessity of this less stringent rule of military
law is in order.
I. History and Constitutionality
The Constitution vests in the Congress the power "[to] make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
forces.' 2  Originally, congressional enactments under this power did
not place any requirements on court-martial verdicts of conviction;
however, a limitation was placed upon the power of a court-martial to
adjudge a penalty of death. 3 Consequently, at least for conviction, a
simple majority was sufficient for all crimes.
This practice continued in the Army until the enactment of the
Articles of War of 1920.14 The Articles required a two-thirds ma-
jority vote to convict for all offenses except those in which the death
penalty was mandatory.15  The simple majority practice persisted in the
Navy until the Uniform Code of Military Justice became effective in
1951.1
What has been the relationship of these practices to the guarantees
of the Constitution? Article I1 of the Constitution provides that:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said
Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within
any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress
may by Law have directed.' 7
And the sixth amendment provides that:
12. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
13. The American Articles of War of 1776, enacted by the second Continental
Congress to govern the Continental Armies, prescribed in section XIV, article 5, that
no sentence of a general court-martial extending to death could be given unless two-
thirds of the officers present should concur therein. The Articles were silent as to any
vote required for findings. In section XIV, articles 10 and 11, however, the Articles
expressly permitted both findings and sentence of the inferior regimental court-martial
to be based upon a simple majority of votes. G. DAvis, MILITARY LAw oF THE UNITED
STATES app. C (3d rev. ed. 1915); W. WINTHRoP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS,
app. 10 (War Dep't reprint 1920). Similarly, in An Act for the Government of
the Navy of the United States, enacted March 2, 1799, 1 Stat. 709, no provision was
made as to votes required for either findings or sentence, but in the following year,
in An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States, enacted April
23, 1800, 2 Stat. 45, article XLI provided that no sentence to death could be imposed
by a general court-martial except with concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.
These provisions were carried forward in the Articles of War of 1786, 1806 and 1874,
and in the Articles for the Government of the Navy of 1838 and 1862.
14. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759.
15. Id. at 795-96.
16. See note 9 supra.
17. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law ....
These provisions have been held to guarantee to all people the essential
elements of trial by jury as they were recognized both in England and
in the United States when the Constitution was adopted;18 that is, (1)
the trial jury should consist of a number of lay persons sufficient to in-
terpose an effective, common-sense judgment between the accused and
his accuser;19 (2) the trial should be under the control of a judge having
power to instruct and to advise the jury;20 and (3) that the verdict of
the jury should be unanimous. 2' If this final element is held to be an in-
tegral part of the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial, how can the
military less-than-unanimous verdict be permitted?
The question was first answered in the landmark decision in Ex
parte Quirin.22 The court approached the interrelationship of articles I
and III with the fifth and sixth amendments, and then answered the
question in this manner:
First, courts-martial are not "courts" within the meaning of Article
III of the Constitution, the 'Judiciary Article," and therefore they are
not directly bound by the provisions of that article relating to jury tri-
als.2" Rather, Congress was given the power to provide for the
trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner "prac-
ticed by civilized nations," and this power was granted "without any
connection between it and the third article of the Constitution defining
the judicial power of the United States ... ."' Thus, courts-martial
18. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288, 290 (1930).
19. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970), rev'g Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276 (1930), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), both to the effect
that a petit jury must consist of twelve men, neither more nor less.
20. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1930), citing Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
21. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 289 (1930), & cases cited therein.
Whether or not this aspect of the right to trial by jury is guaranteed to the accused
before state courts by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment is apparently still an open
question. In Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1906 n.46 (1970), Mr. Justice White
stated: "We intimate no view whether or not the requirement of unanimity is an in-
dispensable requirement of the Sixth Amendment jury trial. While much of the above
historical discussion applies as well to the unanimity as to the 12-man requirement,
the former, unlike the latter, may well serve an important role in the jury function, for
example, as a device for insuring that the Government bear the heavier burden of proof."
22. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
23. Id. at 39 & cases cited therein. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
24. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857), approved in Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942).
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are more properly considered to be article I courts vice article HI
courts, or as Colonel Winthrop has explained: Courts-martial are sim-
ply instrumentalities of the executive power created by Congress for the
President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in commanding the Army
and Navy and enforcing discipline.25
Second, it was not the purpose of either the judiciary article or
the sixth amendment to enlarge the then existing right to a jury trial in
any court. The purpose was only to prevent impairment of the right
to be tried by a jury in all cases in which the right had been recognized
by the common law and in all cases of a like nature that might arise in
the future.2 Since trial by jury was a procedure unknown to military
tribunals at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, neither article
I nor the sixth amendment were thought to have extended the right of
trial by jury to members of the armed forces.2 7
Finally, the fifth amendment cannot be ignored. It provides in
part that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces .... 28
Quirn apparently argued that since criminal cases arising in the land or
naval forces are expressly excepted in the fifth amendment, all other
guarantees of the Bill of Rights not similarly excepted are applicable to
tribunals convened in the land or naval forces.2 9 As early as Ex parte
Milligan,0 however, this exception within the fifth amendment was
extended by implication to include the sixth amendment guarantee of a
trial by jury. 1 This is true, notwithstanding the unequivocal language
of the sixth amendment, because:
[T]he framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the
right of trial by jury, in the sixth amendment, to those persons
who were subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth [amend-
ment]. 32
Insofar as the constitutional provisions just discussed are applica-
ble, it is clear that less-than-unanimous verdicts by courts-martial are not
prohibited by article III or the sixth amendment. This conclusion does
25. W. WINnmop, MiLurr.Y LAw AND PRECEDENTS 16 (Gov't Print. Off. re-
print 1920).
26. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) & cases cited therein.
27. Id. at 40.
28. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (emphasis added).
29. See 317 U.S. at 40.
30. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
31. Id. at 138-39.
32. Ex pilrte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 WMlt.) 2, 123 (1866).
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not, however, foreclose the possibility that the practice in question may
also be closely related to, or even a component of, some other constitu-
tional principle that is indispensable to courts-martial.
For example, the principle that it is the duty of the Government to
establish the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt is a notion
that is so basic in our law that it has become a requirement and a safe-
guard within "the historic, procedural content of 'due process' " of the
fifth amendment. 3 Is the unanimous jury verdict so intertwined with
the concept of due process that it too is guaranteed by the fifth amend-
ment, the grant jury indictment provision notwithstanding?
II. Due Process and the Unanimous Verdict
In Billeci v. United States,34 Judge Prettyman described the con-
nection between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the unanimous
jury verdict in these words:
An accused is presumed to be innocent. Guilt must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. All twelve jurors must be convinced
beyond that doubt; if only one of them fixedly has a reasonable
doubt, a verdict of guilty cannot be returned. These principles are
not pious platitudes recited to placate the shades of venerated
legal ancients. They are working rules of law binding upon the
court. Startling though the concept is when fully appreciated,
those rules mean that the prosecutor in a criminal case must actually
overcome the presumption of innocence, all reasonable doubts as to
guilt, and the unanimous verdict requirement.3 5
In Hibdon v. United States, 6 the question arose as to whether an
accused might waive the third element of a constitutional trial by jury
(the requirement of a unanimous verdict) and consent to being con-
victed by a vote of nine to three on one count and ten to two on another.
Judge Simons reviewed the United States Supreme Court holding that
the first element of trial by jury (i.e., the jury must consist of twelve
persons) could be waived, and an accused could lawfully submit to trial
by a jury of less than twelve.37 He concluded, however, that this ele-
ment and the third element (unanimous verdict) were not equally essen-
33. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952). For a collection of cases
and quotations, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970), which holds "that the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." Id. at 1073.
34. 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
35. Id. at 403 (dictum).
36. 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953).
37. Id. at 837, reviewing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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tial to the administration of justice."' He characterized the latter as
"the inescapable element of due process that has come down to us from
earliest time"3 9 and stated that:
The humanitarian concept that is at the base of criminal
prosecutions in Anglo-Saxon countries, and which distinguishes
them from those of most continental European nations, is the pre-
sumption of innocence which can only be overthrown by proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The unanimity of a verdict in a crimi-
nal case is inextricably interwoven with the required measure of
proof. To sustain the validity of a verdict by less than all of the
jurors is to destroy this test of proof for there cannot be a verdict
supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt if one or more
jurors remain reasonably in doubt as to guilt. It would be a contra-
diction in terms. We are of the view that the right to unanimous
verdict cannot under any circumstances be waived, that it is of the
very essence of our traditional concept of due process in criminal
cases, and that the verdict in this case is a nullity because it is not
the unanimous verdict of the jury as to guilt.40
It is arguable that different jurors necessarily bring to the jury
room widely varying backgrounds of experience, general knowledge
and emotional susceptibility. They may, therefore, "reasonably" differ
as to whether the testimony and other evidence in the case is such as to
meet the test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, possi-
bly because of unconscious impulses or unremembered experiences,
one juror may refuse to place full credence in the testimony of a partic-
ular witness and conclude, at least in his own mind, that there is a doubt.
The fact that the remaining jurors find no such doubt, however, does
not ineluctably render the conclusion of the single juror unreasonable.
The concept of reasonable doubt, far from being precise or certain,
further compounds the problem.4 1 It is doubtlessly viewed with differ-
ing shadings by different jurors. According to Wigmore, "there can be
yet no successful method of communicating intelligibly to a jury a
sound method of self-analysis of one's belief."42 On the other hand, if
we could assume that the fact finders possess a high order of intelligence
and open-mindedness, the dissent of even one who will stand firm
against the pressure of the majority indicates that there is a "reasonable
doubt" in the case.
The argument that the requirement of a unanimous verdict is inex-
38. 204 F.2d at 838.
39. Id.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Mc-
Baine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 255-58 (1944).
42. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497, at 325 (3d ed. 1940).
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tricably interwoven with the element of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt has considerable appeal. The fundamental purpose underlying
both elements is to prevent the conviction of innocent men.43  Relaxa-
tion of either element may create the risk of an unfair or unjust convic-
tion. Thus, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous verdict
requirement appear to be complementary safeguards of due process.
III. The Application of "Military Due Process"
to Courts-Martial
Even if the unanimous veredict requirement were recognized as a
fundamental of due process, the question remains whether due process,
as guaranteed by the fifth amendment, is applicable to courts-martial.
In United States v. Jacoby,44 the United States Court of Military Ap-
peals stated: "[I]t is apparent that the protections in the Bill of Rights,
except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inappli-
cable, are available to members of our armed forces."4 5 It would seem
that this "military due process"4 doubtlessly includes the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The code itself recognizes this and
expressly provides that the court be instructed: "[Tihat in the case
being considered if there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the ac-
cused, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused and he must be
acquitted .... "47
Military tribunals have not analyzed this right beyond this point;
consequently, no case has decided whether the reasonable doubt element
is a constitutional guarantee or merely a congressional one. If it is a
constitutional guarantee, then the question becomes closely analogous
to Billeci and Hibdon discussed above. That is, how can an accused be
guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, if one-third of the court votes to
acquit?
An alternative approach to the same question is to consider either
the reasonable doubt element or the unanimous verdict element to be
required by the congressional mandate just quoted or by the military
common law. If this approach were to be adopted, the Billeci-Hibdon
analogy would also apply-unless the congressional recognition of less-
than-unanimous verdicts elsewhere in the code would qualify this
43. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368-75 (1970) (concurring opinion).
44. 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
45. Id. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 244.
46. United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 77-79, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77-79 (1951).
47. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C. § 851(c) (1964)
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
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rule. 48 The question remains unresolved.
It is not, however, the purpose of this discussion to establish the
the constitutionality of the less-than-unanimous verdict requirement
presently applied in courts-martial. The purpose is to consider the pro-
priety of such a requirement within the context of the present law. This
requires a clear understanding of the precise terms of the common law-
and therefore of constitutional practice.
The constitutional practice is restated by Rule 31(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure: "The verdict shall be unanimous."
This means that all jurors must agree, regardless of whether the verdict
is (1) guilty of the offense charged, (2) guilty of an offense necessarily
included in the offense charged, or (3) not guilty. If even one juror re-
fuses to join the others in any of the three verdicts, a "hung" jury will
result. The case must then be dismissed without a verdict. Conse-
quently:
When twelve jurors sit down to deliberate upon their solemn duty
of pronouncing innocence or guilt upon a fellow human each ex-
poses his own particular views of the evidence to the sound judg-
ment of all with the result that tangential views have little chance
of survival and practially none of getting eleven approving votes. 49,
And, of course, joint consultation, deliberation and argument are part
of the practice.
The jury have the duty of making a diligent effort to arrive at a ver-
dict, and for the purpose of arriving at an agreement as to their
verdict if reasonably possible, it is the duty of the jurors to consult
with each other, to keep their minds open to every reasonable ar-
gument that may be presented by their fellow jurors, and to har-
monize their views if possible by discussion of the evidence.50
In other words, except in those cases where the evidence clearly indicates
either guilt or innocence, the jurors must, often exhaustively, disclose
their preliminary views; compare their inferences, evaluations and sub-
ordinate judgments; discuss the relative import of specific items of evi-
dence; and argue the application of the total factual picture to the care-
fully identified legal questions. All of this must be done with the joint
deliberation necessary to secure unanimity.
On the other hand, compare the Uniform Code provision: "No per-
son may be convicted of any other offense, except. . . by concurrence
48. UCMJ art. 52, 10 U.S.C. § 852 (1964).
49. Sue Hoo Chee v. United States, 163 F.2d 551, 553 (9th Cir. 1947).
50. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1368 (1961). See also Allen v. United States,
164 U.S. 493 (1896); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962); Orton v.
United States, 221 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1955).
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of two-thirds of the members present at the time the vote is taken."'"
This provision establishes a requirement for conviction only-not for
acquittal. Thus an acquittal would result if the vote were five to four
for conviction in a nine member court-martial. This stems from the
Manual for Courts-Martial statement that "[a] finding of not guilty
results as to any specification or charge if no other valid finding is
reached thereon .. ."I Consequently, there are no mistrials result-
ing from "hung" juries.
Conversely, an initial vote of six to three for conviction could possi-
bly result in a guilty verdict without further deliberation. In other
words, even in cases where the evidence may be extensive, highly com-
plicated, unclear, and seriously controverted, there is no real require-
ment for discussion if two-thirds or more vote to convict.
Superficially, it would appear that if the accused could succeed in
implanting a reasonable doubt in the minds of more than one-third of
the court, the accused would be acquitted. Actually, he may be re-
quired to implant a reasonable doubt in the minds of a majority. This
persuasion requirement evolved from United States v. Nash5 3 and similar
United States Court of Military Appeals cases54 allowing a court-martial
to reconsider any finding before it is formally announced in open court. 55
The latest Manual for Courts-Martial has further expanded this, provid-
ing:
Any member of a court may propose that a finding be reconsidered
... . [T]he question shall be determined by a secret written bal-
lot, and a reballot shall be taken on a prior not guilty finding when
a majority of the members vote in favor thereof or on a prior guilty
finding if more than one-third of the members favor reballoting.5 6
51. UCMJ art. 52(a)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (1964). The offenses referred
to in this provision are all offenses other than those for which the death penalty is
made mandatory by law, in which case the concurrence of all the members of the court-
martial present at the time the vote is taken is required. UCMJ art. 52(a)(1), 10
U.S.C. § 852(a)(1) (1964). The only offenses for which the death penalty is manda-
tory, however, are those in violation of article 106 (10 U.S.C. § 906 (1964) ), which
proscribes lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in time of war in or about places under
the jurisdiction of the armed forces or employed in aid of the prosecution of war.
Such offenses are, of course, so extremely rare that the unanimous verdict requirement
in military law may be disregarded for the purposes of this discussion.
52. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 74(d)(3) (1969) [herein-
after cited as 1969 MANUAL].
53. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 550, 18 C.M.R. 174 (1955).
54. In United States v. Gilmore, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 35 C.M.R. 400 (1965), the
Court referred to the Nash rule as effective.
55. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 74(d)(3) (1951).
56. 1969 MANUAL 74(d) (3).
[Vol. 22
The effect of this rule57 is illustrated by specific examples. Assume
a general court-martial with nine members appointed and sitting. If
upon the first ballot on the question of guilt or innocence the vote is
five to four for acquittal, the four members who would convict prob-
ably could not force a reballoting because they do not constitute a ma-
jority. The accused would be acquitted. On the other hand, if the vote
were five to four for conviction, the five who would convict may force
reballoting repeatedly until one or more of the four accedes and votes for
conviction--or until it becomes apparent that none of the four will
change his vote. Of course, in the latter case or if one or more of the
five who would convict should relent and not vote for the continued re-
balloting, a finding of not guilty would be required.
The total effect, therefore, is that in any case where a simple ma-
jority of the members favor conviction, they may be able to force rebal-
loting until a conviction results. To accomplish the conviction, it is only
necessary to persuade enough members to make the difference between
a simple majority and two-thirds of those voting. In actual figures this
means the majority must convert only one more member if the court
consists of either five, seven, eight, nine, ten or twelve members, and
only two if the court consists of eleven or thirteen members."' The
question is moot in the case of a court with only six members since
the two-thirds required to convict will also be a simple majority.
Since more than one-third of the members is required to force re-
balloting, a vote to reballot after an initial vote to convict would indicate
that less than the required two-thirds remained convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In this situation, how-
ever, a vote to reballot is most unlikely and a deadlock with its cor-
responding acquittal is not even possible in the absence of caprice or'
obstructionism by some member.
IV. The Net Effect of a Less-Than-Unanimous Verdict
What then are the significant effects of the military system vis-a-
vis the civilian unanimous verdict requirement? At least four effects
adverse to the accused are readily perceived: (1) a materially lesser
57. UCMI art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1964) delegates to the President the au-
thority to prescribe procedures, which unless conflicting with the code itself or
higher authority have the force and effect of law. Thus, the quoted rule has that
stature in the military system. E.g. United States v. Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 105, 32
C.M.R. 105 (1962).
58. In computing the number of votes required to convict, if a fraction results it
will be counted as one. 1969 MANuLA. 74(d) (3).
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degree of jury discussion, (2) an increase in the danger of precipitancy
in arriving at a verdict, (3) an erosion of the reasonable doubt standard,
and (4) a lessening of the burden upon the prosecution.
A. A Lack of Discussion
The examples of the military system discussed above clearly illus-
trate that in most cases the system itself neither compels nor encourages
any substantial discussion or argument between the members in de-
termining guilt or innocence. Admittedly, there are factors which do
motivate discussion and analysis of the proof by the court in every case,
but these are probably common to both systems. These include the
conscientious approach of the fact finders to their duties, their sense of
individual integrity and their fear of convicting an innocent man. Cer-
tainly, these are all generally deep-seated convictions in military men.
But they are not necessarily an integral part of the system. They are
extrinsic to it.
Even before the reballoting rule was adopted, this author partici-
pated in numerous cases in which exhaustive deliberations on guilt or
innocence which could have been avoided by a single ballot were con-
ducted, but this is not necessarily the rule. Infrequently there may be a
concerted or extended effort on the part of some members to persuade
the others to adopt their belief in the "jury" room. For those who are
senior in rank, the specter of undue influence is always a deterrent. 59
Those who are junior usually experience a natural reluctance to argue
their conclusions at any length for the purpose of convincing their
superiors. In fact, it is somewhat surprising that the military cases reveal
such a quantity of "jury" room discussions.
B. A Hasty Verdict
Concomitant with any reduction of full discussion of the case by
the fact finders, and perhaps in direct proportion to such reduction,
there is an increase in the danger of a precipitant verdict. It must be
remembered that each member of the court is influenced by personal
desires and social pressures.
Innumerable and incalculable shifts, most frequently in the direc-
tion of reason and justice, flow from extended discussion. For example,
a member may misunderstand some aspect of the proof that might be
59. See United States v. Deain, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 17 C.M.R. 44 (1954): "A court
member's freedom and independence of action must remain inviolate. For his actions
and his motives he should be responsible only to God and his conscience." Id. at 53,
17 C.M.R. at 53.
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clarified by discussion; or perhaps his evaluation of the credibility of a
witness might have been unfairly based upon emotions or prejudices that
even brief introspection would modify. Discussion may subdue normal
human reactions such as compassion for the victim or antipathy for the
accused. Discussion might even temper a prejudice fostered by the de-
fendant's demeanor.
Examples of the undesirability of hasty verdicts could be recited
almost indefinitely. The question remains, however, that if a verdict
may be reached with little or no discussion, how often are cases decided
unfairly against an accused because of hasty, impulsive or inadequately
considered ballots? No definite answer is possible, but perhaps an
axiom frequently invoked by the United States Court of Military Appeals
should be paraphrased here: Not only must a court-martial's judgment
actually be untainted, but it must in every respect avoid the very appear-
ance of being precipitant. 60
C. Erosion of a Reasonable Doubt
To what extent if any is the reasonable doubt standard eroded by
less-than-unanimous verdicts of guilty? Again, no empirical or mathe-
matical answer is possible; however, logic and experience suggest that
this erosion may be significant.
The problem is that under the two-thirds requirement, the trial
counsel need not convince a predesignated two-thirds of the court. He
needs only to persuade the most credulous two-thirds.
On the basis of an extensive study of the American jury conducted
at the University of Chicago Law School over a period of years, Pro-
fessors Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel concluded that civilian judges held
identifiably different standards of reasonable doubt than juries. Gen-
erally speaking, judges required lower thresholds of proof before they
would convict in criminal cases. 61 The thresholds held by the judges
were so markedly below those held by juries that at least 11 percent
of the judge-jury disagreements examined were attributed to the juries'
propensity to take "more generously than the judge the law's ad-
monition not to convict unless guilt is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."62  Although the investigators could only speculate as to the
causes of this phenomenon, they referred to the requirement of unanim-
60. See, e.g., United States v. Hedges, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 642, 29 C.M.R. 458 (1960)
(Latimer, J., concurring), citing United States v. Johnson, 318 U.S. 189 (1943); United
States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936).
61. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 182 (1966).
62. Id. at 187.
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ity by the jurors as the most probable factor.63 If they are correct, it
follows that proof sufficient to convince only two-thirds of any group is
probably more certain to be of lesser persuasive quality than that re-
quired to convince all members of the same group.
This whole matter can be viewed yet another way. Most persons
recognize that as you increase the number of jurors necessary for a con-
viction you decrease the probability that an innocent man will be con-
victed. This was tacitly recognized by the Congress when it required
a unanimous verdict to convict for any offense requiring the death
penalty.64 Why else would unanimity have been necessary in these
exceptional cases if the two-thirds concurrence verdict of guilt had of-
fered complete or even adequate assurances of a proper conviction?
In Oregon a circuit court is permitted to enter a verdict of guilty
or not guilty with the concurrence of ten of the twelve jury members,65
which, because of both the greater percentage and the requirement of
concurrence to acquit, is more restrictive than the military rule. Never-
theless:
For whatever savings, if any, are afforded Oregon taxpayers by the
less-than-unanimous jury-verdict provision, corresponding costs are
borne by anyone prosecuted for a crime in Oregon. The primary
cost is that the traditional requirement that a defendant must be
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before he can be punished
has been eroded in Oregon. There is a definite interrelationship
between this burden-of-proof requirement and the number of jurors
required to return a verdict. Reasonable minds could differ as to
whether it takes one, two, or five dissenting jurors before there is
"reasonable doubt" as to guilt. But it is at least clear that reducing
the number of jurors required to return a verdict lessens the burden
on the prosecutor.66
D. Lessening of the Burden of Proof
Even if we were to assume that all fact finders define "proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt" in exactly the same manner, it is almost
axiomatic that a lesser quality and quantity of proof will be required to
induce that degree of persuasion in just two-thirds of the group than in
the whole. As stated in Hibdon v. United States:
63. Id. at 189 n.5.
64. UCMJ art. 52(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1) (1964). See note 51 supra.
In addition, a three-fourths vote is required to sentence an accused to confinement for
more than 10 years, and a unanimous vote is required to sentence an accused to death.
UCMJ art. 52(b), 10 U.S.C. § 852(b) (1964).
65. ORE. CONST. art. I, § 11.
66. Comment, Should Oregon Jury Verdicts be Unanimous in Criminal Cases,
47 ORE. L. REV. 417, 423 (1968).
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It need hardly to be demonstrated that [under a less-than-unani-
mous jury verdict rule] to secure conviction a zealous prosecutor
would carry a far lighter burden of persuasion in convincing a ma-jority of the jury than all of its members, that unjust convictions
would be increased rather than reduced, and the traditional meas-
ure of proof in criminal cases completely destroyed. 67
V. The Argument for the Military Rule
Why must military law authorize conviction of servicemen upon a
standard of proof that may be significantly less exacting than that re-
quired in most courts? As yet no significant effort68 has been exerted
by any group to reform the military less-than-unanimous verdict rule;
consequently, the military has not yet marshalled its justification. At
least one argument seems probable-military necessity.
Simply stated, the argument is that in a military society, the mainte-
nance of discipline is essential to the effectiveness of any fighting force.
Since this is partially maintained through punishment, the punishment
must be prompt and sure. Administration would be seriously impeded
by a unanimous verdict rule for several reasons. The Manual for Courts-
Martial would have to be amended to provide for hung juries and re-
sulting mistrials. The number of mistrials would probably create an in-
tolerable burden to the military in expenditures of time and money for
retrials. Retrials, in turn, would have an adverse impact upon the ef-
ficient accomplishment of military missions.6 9
No one seriously disputes that discipline is the primary purpose
of military justice, 70 and most agree, therefore, that the system of mill-
67. 204 F.2d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 1953).
68. The so-called Chamberlain bill, S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919), drafted by
Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell and sponsored by Senator George E. Chamberlain,
would have required concurrence of three-fourths of the members of Army courts-martial
for conviction, but this provision of the bill was not enacted in the revised Articles of
War of 1920.
69. This omits the occasionally heard complaint that corrupt or unreasonably
obstinate jurors may seriously disrupt procedures under the unanimous verdict rule,
which was advanced as a significant argument during recent English reform proposals,
inasmuch as corruption or unreasoned obstinancy are unlikely to be encountered among
the select group which comprises the membership of a court-martial. Kalven & Zeisel,
Notes for an English Controversy, 48 CHI. B. RECORD 1951 (1967). In those few
cases in which they might occur, moreover, the price of conducting a retrial should
not be considered too costly an alternative to letting a presumptively guilty accused
go free.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Barrow, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 343, 26 C.M.R. 123 (1958);
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES ON TREAT-
MENT OF DESERTERS FROM MILrARY SERVICE, S. REP. No. 91-93, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969).
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tary justice should remain separate from the civilian system.71 Still, vast
social changes have taken place in the Armed Forces in recent years, and
it is quite possible that the traditional interrelationship between military
discipline and military justice is no longer valid.
Most of the early voices in this area espoused a markedly different
system of justice because the aim of an armed force, i.e., successfully
combating the enemy, was clearly distinguishable from that of the civil-
ian community. Perhaps the traditional view, which prevailed until
World War I, was most forcefully expressed by a Union general in
testimony before a congressional committee in 1879. General Sherman
said:
I agree that it will be a grave error if by negligence we permit the
military law to become emasculated by allowing lawyers to inject
into it the principles derived from their practice in civil courts,
which belong to a totally different system of jurisprudence.
The object of civil law is to secure to every human being in a
community all the liberty, security, and happiness possible, con-
sistent with the safety of all. The object of military law is to govern
armies composed of strong men, so as to be capable of exercising
the largest measure of force at the will of the nation.
These objects are as wide apart as the poles, and each re-
quires its own separate system of laws, statute and common. Any
army is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. Every
enactment, every change of rules which impairs this principle weak-
ens the army, impairs its values, and defeats the very object of its
existence. All the traditions of civil lawyers are antagonistic to
this vital principle, and military men must meet them on the
threshhold of discussion, else armies will become demoralized by
engrafting on our code their deductions from civil practice.72
Even Dean John H. Wigmore, one of the most eminent legal
scholars of this century, said in 1919:
The prime object of military organization is victory, not justice. In
that death struggle which is ever impending, the Army, which de-
fends the nation, is ever strained by the terrific consciousness that
the nation's life and its own is at stake. No other objective than
victory can have first place in its thoughts, nor cause any remission
of that strain. If it can do justice to its men, well and good. Butjustice is always secondary, and victory is always primary.73
71. The separateness described in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), is
necessary because "the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned
to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not
the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjust-
ment." Id. at 140. See also O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1968).
72. Quoted in Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Special Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 780 (1949).
73. 24 MD. ST. B. Ass'N TRANSACTIONS 183, 188 (1919), which reports an
address of Dean Wigmore.
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And General Dwight Eisenhower echoed the same thought as re-
cently as 1948 when in a speech at the New York Lawyers' Club he
said:
I should like to call your attention to one fact about the Army,
about the armed services. It was never set up to insure justice.
It is set up as your servant, a servant, of the civilian population of
this country to do a particular job, to perform a particular function;
and that function, in its successful performance, demands within
the Army somewhat, almost of a violation of the very concepts
upon which our government is established. 74
As broad generalizations, there is doubtless some merit in these
pronouncements. But in what specific manner and to what extent
would a unanimous verdict rule in military courts detract from General
Sherman's pronouncement that soldiers are obliged to obey, Wigmore's
insistence upon victory, or Eisenhower's pragmatic or functional ap-
proach?
The relationship between prompt and sure punishment and the
maintenance of discipline is significant only when the offense involved
is of a nature to be directly and palpably inimical to the relationship
between superiors and subordinates, such as disobedience of a com-
mand or disrespect toward a superior. In such cases the deterrent and
rehabilitative effects of punishment should be effective. When, how-
ever, other types of offenses are being tried by courts-martial, considera-
tions other than the maintenance of discipline form the backdrop. For
example, the trial of a military person for an offense such as burglary
is conducted primarily as a means of protecting the civilian or military
community from being victimized, terrorized, or ravaged by the mem-
bers of an armed force.75 The trial of a military person for an offense
such as presenting a false claim has as its primary purpose the protec-
tion of the government itself from fraudulent or perverted practices. 76
Military prosecutions for an offense such as bigamy are intended to pro-
tect the armed forces of the United States from discredit and disgrace. 77
74. Reported in a letter from the New York State Bar Association to the Con-
gressional Committee on Military Justice, dated January 29, 1949, now among the
"Morgan Papers" in the Harvard Law School Library. Even Mr. Justice Black in
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), voiced a version of this
argument in these words: 'To the extent that those responsible for performance of
this primary function [the fighting function] are diverted from it by the necessity of
trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served." Id. at 17.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 556, 40 C.M.R. 259, 268
(1969).
76. See UCMJ art. 132, 10 U.S.C. § 932 (1964); cf. United States v. Hutchins,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 422, 18 C.M.R. 46 (1955).
77. See, e.g., UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C. 934 (1964) (expressly proscribing "all
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While it may be argued that the commission of such offenses might
have some adverse effect upon the quality of discipline and the obedi-
ence to orders in the Armed Forces, any such effect is at most indirect
and doubtlessly very limited. Clearly, basing the necessity for a less-
than-unanimous verdict upon the premise that discipline and obedience
must be maintained is nothing less than depriving all defendants of the
greater safeguards of the civilian rule on the basis of an argument ap-
plicable to only some of them. And the number of trials for offenses
of a purely "civilian" nature is not at all insignificant."
The relationship between prompt and sure punishment of offenders
and the effectiveness of a fighting force will be critically affected by the
organization and structure of that force. But,
There is a certain anachronistic ring to arguments that a com-
mander needs to control courts-martial to obtain instant and un-
thinking response from his men and that any lessening of his powers
would weaken his ability to maintain discipline. The truth is that
the nature of the military has changed dramatically since World
War II and likewise the nature of discipline has had to change.
Servicemen today have more technical jobs, better education, and
more individual rights than ever before. Technology has trans-
formed the military into a highly bureaucratic society. A whole
new class of enlisted men, called specialists, came into being after
the Korean War. They perform technical jobs and are not placed
in a troop environment. Many servicemen work in jobs not much
different from that of a civil servant or a corporation employee,
and substantial numbers live off post. . . . Most servicemen are
not given specialized combat training, and since some 20 men are
now needed in support for every combat soldier, there is no need for
them ever to be in combat. Seventy-five percent of enlisted men
are serving their mandatory tour and will return to civilian life
when it is completed. . . . This change in the nature of the mili-
tary inevitably calls for a reevaluation of traditional military atti-
tudes toward discipline and the role of the commander. .... 79
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. ); 1969 MANUAL
213(c).
78. Although precise statistics are not available, it is to be noted that of the
fifty-eight "punitive articles" of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, fifteen (arts.
118-32) proscribe well-known common law crimes, and article 134 not only covers
numerous offenses which are common in civilian penal codes, such as bigamy, fleeing
from the scene of an accident, pandering, unlawful entry, etc., but also numerous of-
fenses which are denounced as noncapital crimes or offenses by enactments of Congress
or under authority of Congress and made triable in the Federal civil courts. 1969
MANUAL 127(c) (Table of Maximum Punishments). But see O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258 (1969), which holds that these "common law" offenses such as rape and
house-breaking must also be "service connected;" otherwise the court-martial lacks
jurisdiction.
79. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REv. 1, 92, 93
(1970).
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The threat of prompt and sure punishment may deter the service-
man who is contemplating a breach of discipline. The present judicial
and administrative practices of the Armed Forces, however, tend materi-
ally to diminish this effect. Certainly, death by hanging or a firing
squad in view of the culprit's companions would have a marked impact
on discipline. So also would lesser punishments executed publicly to
the disgrace of the convicted offender, such as whipping or drumming
from the service. 80
In today's highly complex military society, however, when a com-
mander finds it necessary to resort to a general or special court-martial,
he will often separate the offender from his fellow servicemen by con-
finement. He may even find it possible to transfer the offender to an
entirely separate and often distant command for trial.s1 In either situ-
ation, the commander's action regarding the court-martial and the pub-
lication of that fact within his command will probably constitute the only
deterrent or corrective impetus from the case. Later when the trial has
been completed and acted upon by the convening authority, a "court-
martial order"812 will ordinarily be published within the command to
which the offender was assigned at the time of his offense. By then,
however, the mobility of personnel and the lapse of time often preclude
the order from having any appreciable "disciplinary" value.
83
Critics have argued that the unanimous verdict rule has a deleteri-
ous effect upon law enforcement in its civilian application because it
prompts compromise verdicts and unduly lenient sentences. These, in
turn, are said to encourage rather than to deter potential offenders.84 If
80. This practice in which the convicted accused, before an assembly of military
persons, was stripped of the insignia of his service and rank and was escorted from
the station to the roll of drums is seldom done in the armed services of today.
81. This is especially true since the enactment of the Military Justice Act of
1968, UCMJ arts. 1-140, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (Supp. V, 1970), which makes the as-
signment of a lawyer as counsel to the accused virtually mandatory in special courts-
martial. The services have found it more and more necessary to conduct courts-martial
in the few commands to which adequate lawyers have been assigned. See, e.g., Selman,
The Military Justice Act of 1968: Some Problems and Practical Solutions, 23 JAG
J. 147 (1969).
82. An abstract of charges, proceedings, findings and sentence of a court-martial,
and its initial appellate review. 1969 MANUAL app. 15.
83. Of course it is also desirable, in the interests of discipline, to remove an in-
corrigible from continued close association with other members of the armed services.
United States v. Barrow, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 343, 345, 26 C.M.R. 123, 125 (1958). This is
hardly a valid argument, however, for making convictions easier or for lessening the
quantum of proof or standard of persuasion required to determine whether a particular
accused is or is not guilty of a specific offense.
84. Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21 Miss. L.J. 185, 196
(1950): "It is not the comparatively few cases wherein the jury fails to agree that
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this were true, adoption of the rule would of course have an adverse
impact upon discipline in a military setting. But to attribute all the
ills of our judicial system to this single, time-honored safeguard is a
gross over-simplification. The assertion that a person inclined to-
ward a breach of discipline or insubordination would calculate so pre-
cisely his chances of escaping appropriate punishment ignores modem
studies in criminology and criminal psychology.8 5 Further, any such
assertion is totally devoid of empirical support.
Any evaluation of the necessity or desirability of retaining the cur-
rent two-thirds vote requirement for conviction in court-martial practice
must ultimately recognize that a unanimous verdict rule, or even a less-
than-unanimous vote rule which required the same percentage for
acquittal as for conviction, would probably result in many hung jury
cases." This may not be undesirable. In one sense, the possibility of
a hung jury would be a "safeguard to liberty. '8 7  Concededly, how-
ever, an appreciable number of hung juries might adversely affect the
speedy and efficient administration of military justice in addition to rais-
ing its cost. How severe would this adverse effect and this additional
burden probably be?
In their studies of the American jury, Professors Kalven and Zeisel
reported that out of 3,512 jury cases that they analyzed from unanimous
verdict jurisdictions, only 5.6 percent resulted in hung juries. Out of 64
jury cases from the remaining jurisdictions, 3.1 percent still resulted
in hung juries. s8 Since approximately 10 percent of the total trials re-
sulting in convictions are tried before juries, 9 only about one-half of
makes the difference. It is the bare fact that all twelve of the jury must agree that
causes the mischief. . . . The law violator takes this into account when he wilfully
breaks the law. The criminal lawyer knows this is his trump card in the event of a
trial. The state realizes that even one juror can block its best effo, ,s to carry out the
will of the legislative majority. Therefore, unless the case is as 'strong as horse radish'
there is usually a compromise. As a consequence, the guilty man takes a small fine in-
stead of the heavy penalty contemplated by the law maker. In effect, the law violator
is not suppressed, but simply licensed. Thus the rule of unanimity thwarts the enforce-
ment of the law without even entering the jury box."
85. See, e.g., D. ABRAHAMSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME (1960); E. SUTHER-
LAND & D. CRESSY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (7th ed. 1966).
86. 1969 MANUAL 74(d)(3). See text accompanying note 52 supra.
87. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
88. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 461 (1966).
89. Professors Kalven and Zeisel, utilizing U.S. Bureau of Census Judicial
Criminal Statistics for 1945, report that in trials for major crimes 75 percent involve
guilty pleas, 10 percent waiver of juries, and 15 percent jury trials, but they comment
that the jury waiver rate is much higher in trials for misdemeanors. Id. at 18. A
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one percent of the total cases result in hung juries in unanimous verdict
jurisdictions, and only about one-third of one percent in the less-than-
unanimous civilian jurisdictions. Assuming for the moment that these
statistics are applicable to courts-martial, the probability of any serious
impact that they might have upon discipline or military efficiency is
doubtful at best. Even if there is an effect on discipline, these disad-
vantages do not appear to be too great a price to pay for a full implemen-
tation of the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.9 0
The frequency of hung juries in courts-martial, however, would in
all probability not parallel the experience in civilian courts. This is be-
cause of the marked difference between court-martial members and their
civilian counterparts. Civilian jurors are normally selected on the basis
of voter registration listings, inclusion in telephone directories, tax
rolls, etc. Court-martial members, on the other hand are individuals se-
lected by the convening authority. The Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice requires that the convening authority select those "best qualified for
the duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of
service, and judicial temperament."'" Because of the random selection
of civilian jurors, they usually, or optimally at least, represent a fair
cross-section of the community or judicial district in which the court is
sitting. The members of courts-martial, however, are generally com-
missioned officers.9 2  These officers normally hold at least one college
better breakdown of this nature is probably found in 1967 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE Di-
RECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table 4(D).
There, of 26,344 criminal defendants who were convicted in United States district courts
during the fiscal year which ended June 30, 1967, only 8.2 percent were convicted by
jury, approximately 88 percent having involved pleas of guilty or nolo contendere and
approximately 4 percent having involved a waiver of trial by jury. No comparable
figures are available respecting trials by courts-martial since the privilege of waiving
trial by members of a court-martial and being tried solely by a military judge was
not granted in military law until August 1, 1969, the effective date of the Military
Justice Act of 1968. UCMJ art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. V, 1970).
90. These percentages would equal respectively only about 15 and 10 trials by
general court-martial out of the total of approximately 3,000 such trials conducted
annually in all services which result in convictions.
91. UCMJ art. 25(d)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1964).
92. Although enlisted members are eligible to sit in certain cases (UCMJ art.
25(c), 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1964) ), the experience of the author is that accused
rarely request their presence and that they sit in extremely few cases. Respecting offi-
cers as fact finders, it has been observed that "[mien, in contrast with women, and
persons of higher in contrast with lower status occupations have higher participation,
influence, satisfaction and perceived competence for the jury task .... . Strodbeck,
James & Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc. RaV. 713, 718
(1957).
For a case involving the law applicable to the selection of enlisted persons as
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degree, and often more than one. They have been indoctrinated with
a concern for discipline, justice and its processes, and usually they have
had broad experience in leadership. Logically, therefore, they may well
be more competent jurors than the average civilian. 93  Addition-
ally, they are predominantly males who are allegedly less affected by
sentiment, and they will suffer no financial detriment or other disad-
vantage from their service as a member of a court-martial. 9 These dif-
ferences would seem conducive to a greater probability of agreement
among court-martial members than among civilian jurors with more di-
verse background and experiences.
As Professor Kalven observed, it is a miracle that juries are able to
reach any agreement at all because of the divergent views held by the
various jurors at the commencement of their deliberations.9 5 For this
reason, hung juries would be expected if courts-martial were brought
under the unanimous verdict rule, but the frequency of their occurence
and their consequences must remain the subject of conjecture. Neither
appears to be a threat of any magnitude.
If there is any threat to the military, it lies in blindly following
General Sherman's views and thus ignoring the vast differences be-
tween today's military organization and the Union army of 1860. Tre-
mendous social changes have taken place; the stakes in the matter are
far too important to be won or lost by arguments or concepts that have
become outmoded. Recently, Mr. Justice Brennan wrote:
It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted
by a standard of proof which leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper fact finder of his guilt
with utmost certainty.96
This "certainty" does not exist in the military. It is hardly un-
reasonable to extend this protection to the military man.
members of courts-martial, see United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R.
3 (1964).
93. Professors Kalven and Zeisel report that markedly different judgments
commonly occur between judges and juries respecting the credibility of witnesses, whereas
this would probably be reasonably consistent among members of a court-martial be-
cause of the broad similarity of their educational and experience backgrounds. H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 90, at 186.
94. They do not, of course, lose any pay or allowances while serving on courts-
martial and are frequently relieved of all conflicting military duties.
95. Kalven, The Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 7 U.
Cm. L. SCHOOL REcoRD 6, 61 (1958).
96. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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